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Feedback loops between population dynamics of individuals and their ecological environment are
ubiquitously found in nature, and have shown profound effects on the resulting eco-evolutionary
dynamics. Incorporating linear environmental feedback law into replicator dynamics of two-player
games, recent theoretical studies shed light on understanding the oscillating dynamics of social
dilemma. However, detailed effects of more general nonlinear feedback loops in multi-player games,
which is more common especially in microbial systems, remain unclear. Here, we focus on ecological
public goods games with environmental feedbacks driven by nonlinear selection gradient. Unlike
previous models, multiple segments of stable and unstable equilibrium manifolds can emerge from
the population dynamical systems. We find that a larger relative asymmetrical feedback speed for
group interactions centered on cooperators not only accelerates the convergence of stable manifolds,
but also increases the attraction basin of these stable manifolds. Furthermore, our work offers an
innovative manifold control approach: by designing appropriate switching control laws, we are able to
steer the eco-evolutionary dynamics to any desired population states. Our mathematical framework
is an important generalization and complement to coevolutionary game dynamics, and also fills
the theoretical gap in guiding the widespread problem of population state control in microbial
experiments.
POPULAR SUMMARY
Changes in environment where individuals interact and
compete can drastically impact evolutionary course and
outcome in a wide variety of population systems, ranging
from microbial cooperation to antibiotic resistance evo-
lution. Such environmental changes are often unprece-
dented in the nature or simply the result of manual in-
terventions using control devices like chemostat. There
has been growing interest in incorporating environmental
feedbacks into eco-evolutionary dynamics, yet it remains
largely unknown if it is possible (and how) to steer eco-
evolutionary dynamics with external switching feedback
control laws that adjust selection gradient in the pop-
ulation systems. To fill this theoretical gap, we study
eco-evolutionary dynamics of group cooperation with en-
vironmental feedbacks that modulate multi-person public
goods game interactions. We find the existence of stable
equilibrium manifold where the population can settle on
and derive potential external control inputs that can steer
the population to any desired states.
In this work, we extend the mathematical framework of
eco-evolutionary game dynamics to incorporate realistic
asymmetrical environmental feedbacks, for game interac-
tions organized by focal cooperators may have a differ-
ent efficiency than the ones by defectors. Because of such
complex interactions, multiple segments of stable and un-
stable manifolds can emerge from the population dynam-
ical systems. Our work is in line with previous experi-
mental work demonstrating the existence of (unstable)
manifold (‘separatrix’) in population systems. Our re-
sults further demonstrate that the stability of these man-
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ifolds can be manipulated by designing population-state
dependent switching control laws that tune the nonlinear
selection gradient in order to steer the population system
to enter any desired states.
Our work combines control theory with evolutionary
game dynamics, and provides deep insight into methods
for (i) stabilizing equilibrium manifold emerging from
group cooperation, and more importantly, (ii) conceiv-
ing switching control laws that can steer the system to
reach any desired states. Although our present study
is focused on group cooperation in multi-person public
goods games, our results on manifold control are appli-
cable to many other important situations, such as bal-
ancing excitatory and inhibitory interactions in neuronal
populations and suppressing evolution of drug resistance
in cancer treatment, just to name a few.
I. INTRODUCTION
The feedback between environment and evolutionary
dynamics is widespread in a large number of natural
systems [1–5]. In human society, a depleted environ-
ment or resource state favors cooperation which results
in the mutual growth for both environmental state and
cooperators, while subsequently the free-riders increase
which in turn leads to the the degradation of the en-
vironment [6, 7]. Understanding this oscillating sys-
tem dynamics is of vital importance when dealing with
the world-wide problems in human society, ranging from
overgrazing of common pasture land, overfishing, to some
big challenges like pollution control and global warm-
ing [8–12]. Similar joint effects can also be obtained in
some psychological-economic systems, such as social wel-
fare, overuse of antibiotics and anti-vaccine problems [13–
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In particular, similar eco-evolutionary feedback loops
exist broadly in microbial systems, which has aroused
great concern in evolutionary biology and systems biol-
ogy in recent years [17–20]. Among microbes, the co-
operation often emerges due to the secretion or the re-
lease of public goods, such as extracellular enzymes or
extracellular antibiotic compounds [21–25]. A fundamen-
tal problem is how these bidirectional feedbacks between
ecology and evolutionary dynamics affect the emergence
of long-term existence of cooperation as well as the cor-
responding ecological consequences, which is of particu-
lar interest in both biology and ecology [20, 26–30]. An
experimental study confirms the existence of strong feed-
back loop between laboratory yeast population dynamics
and the evolutionary dynamics of the SUC2 gene which
can mediate the cooperative growth of budding yeast [31].
This feedback can even determine the demographic fate
of those social microbial populations. Besides population
density, there are many other ecological properties that
have been found to play an important role in such recip-
rocal feedbacks, such as spatial structures of the popula-
tion, resource regeneration and supply capacity [4, 5, 32–
34].
Furthermore, to give a clear sight into these feedback-
evolving games, a theoretical framework called coevolu-
tionary game theory is proposed to analyze the coupled
evolution of strategies and environment [35–39]. The core
idea is to incorporate the game-environment feedback
mechanism into replicator dynamics, in which the feed-
back changes the payoff structure and further influences
the evolution of strategies [40, 41]. Such framework suc-
cessfully shows the emergence of an oscillating tragedy
of the commons. Similar cycles are also confirmed in
asymmetric evolutionary games with heterogenous envi-
ronment [42]. As a meaningful example of application,
the framework is used for exploring the effects of intrin-
sic growing capacity of the resources with punishment
and inspection mechanisms [43]. In summary, these eco-
evolutionary models reveal the great role the feedback
loop plays in resolving social dilemma and promoting the
emergence of long-term cooperation.
However, it has been proved that in most microbial sys-
tems, the essential factor that creates density-dependent
(or other ecological property-dependent) selection which
leads to the existence of feedback loop is the preferen-
tial access to the common good for cooperators [44, 45].
Such preferential access mechanism related to selection
direction indicates an important fact that the multipli-
cation factor of cooperators in public goods game (PGG)
may actually be influenced by how well they fare against
defectors (namely, natural selection gradient in the pop-
ulation). This process in turn affects the evolutionary
dynamics, and leads to the existence of an asymmetrical
feedback. While most of the previous works focus on two-
player games with environment feedback [40, 42], this se-
lection gradient engineering via asymmetrical feedback in
PGG, which is more general in microbial systems, is ig-
nored; the effects for this feedback loop remains unclear.
In addition, there still lacks a proper understanding of
nonlinear feedback mechanisms since most studies con-
centrate on linear feedback laws. Further, when looking
into the current experimental results in microbial sys-
tems, we find that there exists a big theoretical gap on
how to effectively steer a given initial population state to
a desired final state in coevolutionary games dynamics,
which may have wide applications in systems biology.
To advance all these important issues, in this work,
we propose a general framework which extends the two-
player games with environmental feedback to coevolu-
tionary multi-player games with asymmetrical feedback
driven by nonlinear selection gradient. Inspired by the
experimental results in [31] that reveals the existence
of strong feedback loop between population strategy and
population density as well as the emergence of ‘separa-
trix’ line in dynamics, we shall provide a general model
to describe similar eco-evolutionary dynamics by consid-
ering ecological properties solely being affected by the
fraction of cooperators as a benefit of cooperation, which
can be described by the multiplication factor of coop-
erators. Unusually, we find the emergence of multiple
segments of stable and unstable manifolds with a num-
ber of different feedback control functions, which is a new
phenomenon that is totally different from the solely inte-
rior equilibrium situations obtained in previous models.
It is also worthy of noting that the equilibrium curve
of unstable manifold circumstance in our model is in
line with the separatrix obtained by experimental results
in Ref. [31], which indicate the potential power for our
general framework to explain and understand the eco-
evolutionary dynamics in a large amount of the real mi-
crobial systems. Furthermore, a larger relative changing
speed of the asymmetrical feedback can not only accel-
erate the convergence speed of stable manifolds, but also
increase the attraction basin of the stable manifolds. Our
model reveals the detailed effects of nonlinear selection
gradient engineering feedback loop in PGG, which is an
important complement and generalization for the previ-
ous coevolutionary framework.
Moreover, we highlight the conclusion that when in-
corporating time-dependent or state-dependent switch-
ing laws which can actually controls the stability of the
possible manifolds in our framework [46–48], i.e., using
manifold control, we can steer the coevolutionary games
dynamics to any desired region. Therefore, our frame-
work can be widely applied into culture refresh modes
for establishing continuous culture devices and design-
ing needed chemostat for microbial experiments, which
is of great significance in systems biology and microbial
ecology [49–51].
II. MODELING FRAMEWORK
Here we propose a general framework for evolution-
ary dynamics with feedback loops in PGG. Our model
is inspired by experimental results in [31] which con-
firms the existence of strong feedback loop between lab-
3FIG. 1. Experiment results in [31] and schematic of our eco-evolutionary model framework. (A) Eco-evolutionary trajectories
of yeast population density and the fraction of cooperators, SUC2 gene. This experimental result consists of 60 cultures over
five growth-dilution cycles. The phase graph shows clearly two regions divided by a separatrix line, over which the system
converges to an eco-evolutionary equilibrium, while under which the population goes extinct. The separatrix line is predicted by
a bi-phasic logistic model, provided in [31]. (B) Theoretical gap on control problems of coevolutionary dynamics in microbial
systems: how to steer the given initial population state (x0, y0) to a desired final state (x1, y1) with external feedback control
laws. (C) Schematic of model framework: eco-evolutionary games with asymmetrical feedback driven by nonlinear selection
gradient in public goods game.
oratory yeast population dynamics and the evolutionary
dynamics of cooperators, SUC2 gene, as shown in Fig.
1(A). Similar feedback loops originating from the prefer-
ential access to the public goods for cooperators has also
been proved to exist in many microbial systems. The
phase graph of the coevolutionary system is clearly di-
vided into two regions by the separatrix line, over which
the system converges to an eco-evolutionary equilibrium
4and the population survives, while under which the pop-
ulation goes extinct. Of particular interest, a specific bi-
phasic logistic mathematical model has been proposed
to reproduce the emergence of separatrix line, in which
the population growth rates of cooperators and defec-
tors are distinguished under different cooperator densi-
ties. However, we still lack of a general framework in
multi-player games for describing similar coevolutionary
dynamics of population strategy and different ecological
properties, in a way that population density in Fig. 1(A)
can be included as an example. Meanwhile, current co-
evolutionary game theory frameworks exclusively focus
on linear feedback laws, the detailed effects of nonlinear-
ity in feedback loops remain unclear. Moreover, in Fig.
1(B), we raise an important control problem in general
coevolutionary games dynamics which has wide applica-
tions in similar microbial experiments: how to effectively
steer the given initial population state (x0, y0) to a de-
sired final state (x1, y1) with external feedback control
laws? To make progress on all these unsolved issues, in
what follows we present a novel coevolutionary model
with feedback laws that can be engineered based on non-
linear selection gradient in the system.
Consider a well-mixed population. An individual finds
itself in a group of size S + 1, with S other players par-
ticipating in the PGG. All players can choose to be ei-
ther a cooperator who contributes c to the public pool
or a defector who free rides others’ efforts in the group.
In classical PGG, the total contributions are multiplied
by a multiplication factor r and then divided equally
among all participants. In this work, to describe the phe-
nomenon that cooperators have preferential access to the
common good in real microbial systems which facilitates
the formation of an asymmetrical feedback loop, we as-
sume the multiplication factors of cooperators and defec-
tors are different, denoted by rc and rd respectively, and
rc ≥ rd. Without loss of generality, we keep rd constant
and let rc change based on nonlinear selection gradient
feedback [52]. In turn, rc affects the relationship of coop-
erator’s and defector’s payoffs and further drives evolu-
tionary dynamics. In this way, we characterize all kinds
of ecological properties affected by the fraction of coop-
erators as a benefit of cooperation that can be described
by cooperator’s multiplication factor, which makes our
framework more general. The schematic of this coevolu-
tionary game framework is shown in Fig. 1(C).
Assume x denotes the frequency of cooperators in the
population. For any given focal individual, the chance
that k out of other S individuals are cooperators is
(
S
k
)
xk(1− x)S−k.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we set coop-
erator’s cost c equal to 1. Therefore the expected payoffs
of cooperators and defectors, Pc and Pd, are
Pc =
S∑
k=0
(
S
k
)
xk(1− x)S−k
[
(k + 1)rc
S + 1
− 1
]
=
1 + Sx
S + 1
rc − 1
Pd =
S∑
k=0
(
S
k
)
xk(1− x)S−k krd
S + 1
=
Sx
S + 1
rd
(1)
Then the replicator dynamics for the fraction of cooper-
ators x is
x˙ = x(1− x)(Pc(x, rc)− Pd(x))
= x(1− x)
(
Sx+ 1
S + 1
rc − 1− Sx
S + 1
rd
)
(2)
Meanwhile, the feedback-evolving dynamics, i.e., ecolog-
ical property evolution in Fig. 1(C) is given by
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)f(x, rc) (3)
where  ≥ 0 denotes the relative changing speed of rc,
the cooperator’s multiplication factor, compared to strat-
egy dynamics. The logistic term (rc − α)(β − rc) en-
sures that rc is restrained to the range [α, β], which
satisfies 1 < α < β < S + 1 according to the social
dilemma in PGG. In addition, f(x, rc) is a control func-
tion that describes the asymmetrical feedback mecha-
nisms in our model. While f actually characterizes the
current impact of population strategies on environment,
previous works exclusively focus on linear selection gra-
dient feedback laws, such as f = θx − (1 − x) in [40]
and f = eLx + eH(1 − x) in [41]. Here, we stress our
effects on generality of nonlinearity in feedback control
laws, the general form of which is:
f(x, rc) =Φ0(x, rc)(Φ1(x, rc)− a1)∗
(Φ2(x, rc)− a2)...(an − Φn(x, rc)), (4)
in which
Φ0(x, rc) = Pc − Pd
Φi(x, rc) = θiPc − Pd (5)
and ai ≥ 0, θi > 0, n+ 1 denotes the order of the control
function. In particular, Φ0(x, rc) = Pc − Pd is a natural
and more general form of linear selection gradient.
Finally, our generalized framework of multi-player evo-
lutionary games with asymmetrical feedback driven by
nonlinear selection gradient can be written as follows:
x˙ =x(1− x) (Pc − Pd)
r˙c =(rc − α)(β − rc)(Pc − Pd)∗
((θ1Pc − Pd)− a1)...(an − (θnPc − Pd))
(6)
5III. RESULTS
III.1. Emergence of multiple segments of stable
and unstable equilibrium manifolds
Firstly, we analyze the simplest circumstance in which
the feedback control term f is a quadratic function, i.e.,
n = 1:
f(x, rc) = (Pc − Pd)(a1 − (θ1Pc − Pd)) (7)
The co-evolutionary model is explicitly described by:{
x˙ = x(1− x) (Pc − Pd)
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)(Pc − Pd)(a1 − (θ1Pc − Pd))
(8)
In Fig. 2, we show the emergence of multiple segments
of stable and unstable equilibrium manifolds using phase
graphs under different conditions. The parameters are as
follows: α = 1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5,  = 2, θ1 = 2
and a1 = 2, 0.5, 0 respectively. In addition, in Fig. 2(D),
we present all curves that satisfy f = 0 in Fig. 2(A)-
(C). In the following parts of this paper, to clearly de-
scribe the stability of fixed points, we name Pc = Pd
as the equilibrium curve and θiPc − Pd = ai the con-
trol curves, in separate. Under these parameters, there
are five possible fixed points on the boundary and an
equilibrium curve for the system in total. Among the
five boundary fixed points, (x = 0, rc = 1.5) is al-
ways stable and (x = 0, rc = 3.5), (x = 1, rc = 1.5),
(x = 1, rc = 3.5) are always unstable, while the stability
of (x = 1, rc =
25
16 +
ai
2 ) depends on the parameter ai.
Detailed proofs are provided in Appendix A. Of particu-
lar interest, here we focus on the stability of the equilib-
rium curve. Unusually, we obtain the emergence of stable
equilibrium manifolds in both Fig. 2(B) and Fig. 2(C),
which means the system can finally evolve to many dif-
ferent stable states depending on the initial conditions.
This new phenomenon is totally different from the solely
interior fixed points situation discussed in previous mod-
els [40, 41]. Moreover, the equilibrium curve of unstable
manifold situations in our model (see Fig. 2(A)) is in
line with the phase separatrix observed by experimental
work in Fig. 1(A), which indicates the potential power
for our general framework to explain the abundant eco-
evolutionary phenomena shown in real microbial systems.
Additionally, we provide detailed proof of the stability of
the manifolds in the following section. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we use parameters given in Fig.
2(C) in which θ1 = 2 and a1 = 0 as an example. The
schematic of this proof is shown in Fig. 3.
Assume (x∗, r∗c ) is an arbitrary fixed point on the equi-
librium curve Pc = Pd. The phase plane is separated
into two regions by the equilibrium curve, over which
is named as region A while beneath which is region B.
Then (x∗, r∗c ) is stable if and only if
~wi · ~vi < 0 (9)
in a small neighborhood of (x∗, r∗c ), where ~vi is the nor-
mal vector of the equilibrium curve while ~wi is the tra-
jectory field direction, i = 1, 2. According to Eq. 1, the
equilibrium curve Pc = Pd can be written as
rc = rd +
S + 1− rd
Sx+ 1
. (10)
Define h(x) as the slope equation of the equilibrium
curve, we have
h(x) =
drc
dx
= −S(S + 1− rd)
(Sx+ 1)2
(11)
Therefore we get the normal vectors of the equilibrium
curve at (x∗, r∗c ):
~v1 = (−h(x∗), 1)
~v2 = (h(x
∗),−1). (12)
On the other hand, the trajectory vector (x˙, r˙c) satisfies
r˙c < 0, x˙ > 0 when (x, rc) is in region A and r˙c > 0, x˙ < 0
when (x, rc) is in region B, according to Eq. 8. Thus
the trajectory filed directions in a small neighborhood of
(x∗, r∗c ) read
~w1 = (1, lim
Pc→Pd
g(x∗)), Pc → Pd + δ
~w2 = (−1,− lim
Pc→Pd
g(x∗)), Pc → Pd − δ,
(13)
where g(x) is the slope function of the trajectory field:
g(x) =
drc
dx
=
drc/dt
dx/dt
=
(rc − α)(β − rc)(Pc − Pd)(a1 − (θ1Pc − Pd))
x(1− x)(Pc − Pd)
(14)
Substituting Eq. 12 and Eq. 13 in Eq. 9, we reach to the
necessary and sufficient condition that (x∗, r∗c ) is stable:
lim
Pc→Pd
g(x∗) < h(x∗) (15)
Finally let α = 1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5,  = 2,
θ1 = 2 and a1 = 0, we have
h(x∗) = − 7.5
(3x∗ + 1)2
lim
Pc→Pd
g(x∗) =
540x∗ − 45
16(3x∗ + 1)2(x∗ − 1)
(16)
Note that rc ∈ [1.5, 3.5], which leads to x ∈ [1/12, 1] ac-
cording to Eq. 10. Substituting Eq. 16 to Eq. 15, we
have x∗ > 0.25. Therefore when x > 0.25, the trajecto-
ries in the neighborhood of the fixed points will converge
to the equilibrium curve, which proves the stability of
the manifolds. On the contrary, when x ∈ [1/12, 0.25),
we have ~wi · ~vi > 0, the trajectories in the neighborhood
evolves away from the equilibrium curve, in which situ-
ation the manifolds are unstable. Therefore, x = 0.25
is actually a saddle point of the system which satisfies
~wi · ~vi = 0. The typical stable and unstable manifold sit-
uations in a small neighborhood of the equilibrium curve
6FIG. 2. Emergence of stable equilibrium manifolds when feedback control function f is in quadratic forms. (A)-(C) show
phase graph under different control conditions. In all subfigures, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5,  = 2, θ1 = 2. We
change a1 = 2, 0.5, 0 respectively. The stable and unstable part of equilibrium curve are indicated by solid and dashed lines,
in separate. In particular, in (C), we mark the typical stable and unstable manifold situations in a small neighborhood of the
equilibrium curve with red outlines. (D) presents all curves that satisfy f = 0 in (A)-(C).
are marked with red outlines in Fig. 2(C). Similarly,
we derive that the stable region of the equilibrium curve
is x ∈ (0.5595, 1) in Fig. 2(B), while there only exists
unstable manifolds in Fig. 2(A). In summary, we have
proved the emergence of stable equilibrium manifolds in
our framework. Meanwhile, we provided a detailed ap-
proach to calculate the saddle point of the system, which
is the critical point for the stability of the equilibrium
curve.
In Fig. 4, we present the detailed effects of relative
asymmetrical feedback speed. In all subfigures, α = 1.5,
β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5, θ1 = 4, a1 = 0. We give
 = 0.1, 0.5, 2 in Fig. 4(A)-(C) separately. According
to the results presented by the first column which shows
phase graphs under different circumstances, we find that
the relative changing speed of cooperator’s multiplication
7FIG. 3. Schematic of stability proof. The fixed point on
the equilibrium curve is stable if and only if ~wi · ~vi < 0 in
a small neighborhood, where ~vi is the normal vector of the
equilibrium curve while ~wi is the trajectory field direction.
factor has a strong influence on the slope of trajectories
and further affects the position of saddle point on equi-
librium curve, i.e., influences the stability of the mani-
folds. When the relative feedback speed  is larger, the
trajectory field acts steeper and the attraction basin of
these stable manifolds increases. We prove this conclu-
sion analytically using the same approach as shown in
the stability proof section. We keep  as a variable and
the other parameters are the same as in Fig. 4:
Restraining the slope function of trajectory field g(x)
in a small neighborhood of the equilibrium curve, i.e.,
letting Pc → Pd, leads to rc → 1.5 + 2.5/(3x + 1) and
x ∈ [1/12, 1]:
lim
Pc→Pd
g(x) =
(rc − α)(β − rc)(a1 − (θ1Pc − Pd))
x(1− x)
=
135(12x− 1)
32(3x+ 1)2(x− 1)
(17)
Let limPc→Pd g(x) = h(x), we have
x∗() =
27+ 48
324+ 48
=
1
12
+
44
324+ 48
(18)
Therefore when x > x∗ the equilibrium curve is stable,
while when x ∈ [1/12, x∗) the equilibrium curve is un-
stable. Finally, note that x∗() is a monotone decreas-
ing function which indicates when  is larger, x∗ becomes
smaller, i.e, the attraction basin of these stable manifolds
increases.
In addition, the second and third column of Fig. 4 give
variations of strategy dynamics and the cooperator’s mul-
tiplication factor over time, respectively. In each subfig-
ure, we present four different initial conditions. Results
show that a larger  effectively accelerates the conver-
gence speed of stable manifold, while on the hand may
slow down the converging process of unstable manifolds
towards mutual defection state.
In Fig. 5, we show the determinants of the position
of equilibrium curve as well as their detailed effects. In
general framework, the equilibrium equation rc = rd +
S+1−rd
Sx+1 indicates that the position of equilibrium curve is
determined by defector’s multiplication factor rd and the
group size S, according to Eq. 10. Moreover, we have
∂rc
∂rd
=
Sx
Sx+ 1
∂rc
∂S
=
1− (1− rd)x
(Sx+ 1)2
(19)
in which rd ≥ 0 and x ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore ∂rc∂rd ≥ 0,
∂rc
∂S ≥ 0, which means rc increases as rd or S becomes
larger. We present these variation trends in Fig. 5 in
detail, in which S = 3 and rd = 0, 0.5, 1.5, 2.5 in Fig.
5(A) while rd = 1.5 and S = 3, 4, 5, 6 in Fig. 5(B),
respectively.
Furthermore, in Fig. 6, we propose a more complex
situation where n = 2 and f is a cubic function, which
writes
f(x, rc) = (Pc − Pd)((θ1Pc − Pd)− a1)(a2 − (θ2Pc − Pd))
(20)
In all subfigures, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5,  = 2.
In Fig. 6(A)-(C), we present different combinations of the
two control curves when there is no intersection between
control curves and equilibrium curve, while there exists
one intersection in Fig. 6(D)-(E), and finally two inter-
sections in Fig. 6(F). Not surprisingly, the trajectory
field reveals rich probabilities and abundant new varia-
tion trends, an important one of which is (x = 0, rc = 3.5)
becomes a stable fixed point while (x = 0, rc = 1.5) be-
comes unstable, indicating an opposite path direction for
a range of initial conditions compared to the n = 1 situ-
ations we discussed above. In addition, in Fig. 6(A) and
Fig. 6(C)-(F), we obtain existence of stable equilibrium
manifolds ranging from a small neighborhood of the equi-
librium curve like in Fig. 6(D), to a large region like in
Fig. 6(A), as shown by solid lines. On the other hand,
Fig. 6(B) shows completely unstable manifolds situation.
In general, our results reveal that we can control the
stability of the equilibrium curve Pc = Pd as well as
the stability of the manifolds by giving different feed-
back control functions f or changing the relative feed-
back speed . This indicates the possibility for design-
ing population-state dependent switching control laws to
steer the system evolution towards desired directions us-
ing our framework, which may have many applications in
microbial experiments, such as designing culture refresh
modes and building needed chemostat. We provide de-
tailed control approach as well as two control examples
in the next section.
8FIG. 4. The effects of relative asymmetrical feedback speed. In all subfigures, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5, θ1 = 4,
a1 = 0. We change  = 0.1, 0.5, 2 in (A)-(C) respectively. The first column presents phase graphs in different situations while
the second and third columns give variations of strategy dynamics as well as the cooperator’s multiplication factor over time,
correspondingly. We use solid vs dashed lines to indicate the stability of equilibrium curve in all phase graphs.
III.2. Manifold control with switching control laws
Firstly, we incorporate two kinds of switching control
laws in our general framework, one of which is time-
dependent and the other one is state-dependent.
Time-dependent switching control law for the control
function f can be written as follows:
fσ(t)(x, rc) = fσ,k(σ)(x, rc)
= (Pc − Pd)((θσ,1Pc − Pd)− aσ,1)
...(aσ,k(σ) − (θσ,k(σ)Pc − Pd))
(21)
Here σ(t) : [0,∞)→ I, where I represents a finite index
set 1, 2, ...,m. In addition, k(σ)+1 is the order of control
function fσ.
Additionally, state-dependent switching control law
can be written as:
fs(x, rc) = fs,k(s)(x, rc)
= (Pc − Pd)((θs,1Pc − Pd)− as,1)
...(as,k(s) − (θs,k(s)Pc − Pd))
(22)
Here s : q → I, where q ∈ Q, which represents a family of
switching surfaces/guards that partition the x− rc plant
into finite regions, and I is a finite index set 1, 2, ...,m.
k(s) + 1 is the order of control function fs.
In Appendix B, we provide a constructive proof for the
existence of control laws when given a certain final state
(x1, r1) with an initial state (x0, r0) in our general frame-
work. We show the possibility of ending the evolution in
9FIG. 5. How defector’s multiplication factor rd and the group
size S influence the position of equilibrium curve and stable
manifolds. (A) We fix S = 3 and change rd = 0, 0.5, 1.5, 2.5
respectively. (B) We fix rd = 1.5 and set S = 3, 4, 5, 6 respec-
tively.
any desired region, both over or beneath the equilibrium
curve, with any fraction of final cooperators, as long as
the initial fraction of cooperators x0 is not too small,
otherwise the evolution even cannot reach to the equi-
librium curve and directly ends into a mutual defection
state. Note that our proof is a heuristic method for seek-
ing a group of possible control functions, which might
not be the only solution for a certain control problem.
For a better understanding, here we illustrate two de-
tailed control examples in Fig. 7. The evolution begins
from (x0, r0) = (0.2, 1.6) and we give two desired final
states: (x1, r1) = (1, 2.5) and (0.5, 2).
The first example only use time-dependent switching
control law, in which the control functions and the rela-
tive feedback speeds are as follows:
1f1 = 1(Pc − Pd)((θ1,1Pc − Pd)− a1,1)
∗ (a1,2 − (θ1,2Pc − Pd))
= 2(Pc − Pd)((2Pc − Pd)− 1.2)(2− (2Pc − Pd))
2f2 = 2(Pc − Pd)(a2,1 − (θ2,1Pc − Pd))
= 2(Pc − Pd)(1.875− (2Pc − Pd))
(23)
with t large enough for ending the evolutions at the stable
fixed points. The evolution path is the blue trajectory
followed by the red one, which finally stops at (1, 2.5), as
shown in Fig. 7(A). Further, in Fig. 7(B), we provide
detailed time evolutions of the population state (x, rc)
under two control stages. The colors of the curves are
corresponding to two y-Axes while the types of the curves
indicate evolutions under different control laws. The col-
ors of control laws ifi are corresponding to the trajec-
tories in Fig. 7(A).
The second example is composed of three trajectories
in Fig. 7(A): the blue, green and orange one, ending at
(0.5, 2). Here we use time-dependent switching control
law for the first two trajectories, and state-dependent
switching control law for the third control function to
stop the evolution at x = 0.5. The control functions and
the relative feedback speeds are as follows:
1f1 = 2(Pc − Pd)((2Pc − Pd)− 1.2)(2− (2Pc − Pd))
2f2 = 2(Pc − Pd)((2Pc − Pd)− 0)(0.5− (2Pc − Pd))
3f3 = 3.2(Pc − Pd)((2Pc − Pd)− 0)(2− (2Pc − Pd))
(24)
Additionally, in Fig. 7(C), we show time evolutions of
the population state (x, rc) under three control stages.
Specially, the control law 3 is state-dependent and the
evolution stops at about t = 203.8.
In both examples, when system evolves to the equilib-
rium curve and reaches to a stable fixed point, we change
the control function and meanwhile provide a small dis-
turbance δ ≤ 0.01 to rc according to the desired direction,
in which way to restart the evolutions. The absolute er-
rors for the final positions of rc when x reaches to x1 is
within 0.01, according to the numerical solutions of the
equations.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The coevolutionary game between environment and
strategy dynamics has aroused great concern in recent
years, in order to account for the widespread existence
of eco-evolutionary feedback loops and their great im-
portance in a range of natural systems. The existing
feedback-evolving models almost exclusively concentrate
on two-player games with linear environmental feedback
laws. However, there still lacks of a general framework
to describe the coevolutionary dynamics of population
strategy and population properties in PGG. Meanwhile,
the detailed effects of nonlinearity in feedback loops re-
main unclear. Moreover, how to effectively steer the
coevolutionary games dynamics to desired population
states with external feedback control laws in microbial
experiments is a challenging theoretical gap.
Inspired by the experimental results in Ref. [31] that
confirm the existence of strong feedback loops as well as
the emergence of separatrix line in dynamics, we provide
a general framework in multi-player games with asym-
metrical feedback driven by nonlinear selection gradient,
taking into account the fact that the driving factor for
the existence of feedback loops in most microbial systems
is the preferential access to the common good for coop-
erators. We consider ecological properties solely being
affected by the fraction of cooperators, such as popu-
lation density in [31], as a benefit of cooperation that
can be described by cooperator’s multiplication factor,
which makes our framework more general. Unusually, we
find the emergence of multiple segments of stable and
unstable equilibrium manifolds in phase graphs with a
number of control functions, which is a new dynamical
phenomenon that totally different from the solely interior
fixed equilibrium situation obtained in previous works. In
addition, we show that the relative asymmetrical feed-
back speed for group interactions centered on coopera-
tors can accelerate the converging process of the stable
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FIG. 6. Phase graphs under different circumstances where the control function f is in cubic forms. In all subfigures, α = 1.5,
β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5,  = 2. We use solid vs dashed lines to indicate the stability of equilibrium curves. (A) θ1 = 2,
a1 = 1.2, θ2 = 2, a2 = 2. The stable range of the equilibrium curve is x ∈ (0.09355, 1]. (B) θ1 = 2, a1 = 0, θ2 = 2, a2 = 2.
There only exists unstable manifolds. (C) θ1 = 1.5, a1 = 0, θ2 = 4, a2 = 0. The stable range of the equilibrium curve is
x ∈ (0.3395, 1]. (D) θ1 = 2, a1 = 0.5, θ2 = 2, a2 = 2. The stable range of the equilibrium curve is x ∈ (0.1237, 0.3198]. (E)
θ1 = 2, a1 = 0, θ2 = 2, a2 = 0.5. The stable range of the equilibrium curve is x ∈ (0.5984, 1]. (F) θ1 = 4, a1 = 1, θ2 = 4,
a2 = 2. The stable range of the equilibrium curve is x ∈ (0.1057, 0.2226) and x ∈ (0.622, 1].
manifolds while slow down the convergence speed of un-
stable manifolds. And a larger feedback speed increases
the attraction basin of these stable manifolds. Besides,
the position of the equilibrium curve is determined by
defector’s multiplication factor and the group size of the
game. Finally, we propose an innovative manifold control
approach by incorporating switching control laws which
can actually control the stability of the possible manifolds
into our general framework. We provide a constructive
proof as well as two specific control examples to show the
possibility of steering the system states evolving towards
designed directions and entering into any desired region,
as long as the initial fraction of cooperators is not too
small.
Our work sheds light on the potential effects of the
asymmetrical feedback driven by nonlinear selection gra-
dient in PGG, which is an important generalization and
complement for the current coevolutionary game the-
ory frameworks. While some previous works study the
stochastic dynamics on slow manifolds in deterministic
dynamical systems [53, 54], here for the first time, we
find the emergence of stable equilibrium manifolds in
feedback-evolving games. In light of the extensive ex-
istence of feedback loops related to common goods in
microbial systems as well as the consistency of unsta-
ble equilibrium manifold in our general framework and
the phase separatrix in experimental results, our model
reveals great potentials to explain and understand the
eco-evolutionary dynamics in a variety of real micro-
bial systems. Furthermore, the manifold control method
that can steer eco-evolutionary dynamics with external
switching feedback control laws may have wide applica-
tions in microbial experiments, such as designing culture
refresh modes for continuous culture devices and estab-
lishing needed chemostat, which is of great significance
in both systems biology and microbial ecology.
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FIG. 7. Two control examples with switching control laws in general framework. The fixed parameters are as follows: α =
1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5. (A) Phase trajectories of two control examples. We begin from (x0, r0) = (0.2, 1.6) and give two
desired final state: (x1, r1) = (1, 2.5) and (0.5, 2). The first evolution path is the blue trajectory followed by the red one, ending
at (1, 2.5). Here we only use time-dependent switching control law, in which 1 = 2 with θ1,1 = 2, a1,1 = 1.2, θ1,2 = 2, a1,2 = 2
for f1 and 2 = 2 with θ2,1 = 2, a2,1 = 1.875 for f2. Here t is large enough for ending the evolutions at the stable fixed
points. The second example is consist of three trajectories: the blue, green and orange one, ending at (0.5, 2). Here we use
time-dependent switching control law for the first two trajectories, and state-dependent switching control law for the third
control function to stop the evolution at x = 0.5. Detailed parameters for the relative feedback speeds and the control functions
are as follows: 1 = 2 with θ1,1 = 2, a1,1 = 1.2, θ1,2 = 2, a1,2 = 2 for f1, 2 = 2 with θ2,1 = 2, a2,1 = 0, θ2,2 = 2, a2,2 = 0.5 for f2,
and 3 = 3.2 with θ3,1 = 2, a3,1 = 0, θ3,2 = 2, a3,2 = 2 for f3. In both examples, when system evolves to the equilibrium curve
and reaches to a stable fixed point, we change the control function and meanwhile provide a small disturbance δ ≤ 0.01 to rc
according to the desired direction, in which way to restart the evolutions. (B)(C) Detailed time evolutions of the population
state (x, rc) in the first and second control example, respectively. The colors of the curves are corresponding to two y-Axes
while the types of the curves indicate evolutions under different control laws. The colors of control laws ifi are corresponding
to the trajectories in (A). Specially, In (C), the control law 3 is a state-dependent switching control law and the evolution ends
at about t = 203.8.
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Appendix A: Stability of boundary fixed points when the feedback con-
trol function f is in quadratic forms.
Here we discuss the stability of all possible fixed points on the boundary (not include the intersection of equilibrium
curve and the boundary, which is considered as a part of equilibrium curve) when the feedback control f is in
quadratic forms, using parameters shown in Fig. 2 in the main text. The co-evolutionary model can be written as{
x˙ = x(1− x) (Pc − Pd)
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)(Pc − Pd)(a1 − (θ1Pc − Pd))
(1)
in which
Pc =
1 + Sx
S + 1
rc − 1
Pd =
Sx
S + 1
rd
(2)
Applying Eq. 2 as well as the fixed parameters α = 1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5,  = 2, θ1 = 2 into Eq. 3, we have
x˙ = x(1− x)(1 + 3x
4
rc − 1− 4.5
4
x)
r˙c = 2(rc − 1.5)(3.5− rc)(1 + 3x
4
rc − 1− 4.5
4
x)(a1 − (2(1 + 3x
4
rc − 1)− 4.5
4
x))
(3)
Denote J as the Jacobian matrix of the system. We have five boundary fixed points in total:
(1) x = 0, rc = 1.5
J(x = 0, rc = 1.5) =
[− 58 0
0 − 5a12 − 258
]
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are λ1 = − 58 < 0 and λ2 = − 5a12 − 258 < 0, since a1 > 0 in our framework.
Therefore the fixed point (x = 0, rc = 1.5) is always stable.
(2)x = 0, rc = 3.5.
J(x = 0, rc = 3.5) =
[− 18 0
0 a12 +
1
8
]
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are λ1 = − 18 < 0 and λ2 = a12 + 18 > 0. Therefore the fixed point
(x = 0, rc = 3.5) is always unstable.
(3) x = 1, rc = 1.5.
J(x = 1, rc = 1.5) =
[
5
8 0
0 − 5a12 − 516
]
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are λ1 =
5
8 > 0 and λ2 = − 5a12 − 516 < 0. Therefore the fixed point
(x = 1, rc = 1.5) is always unstable.
(4) x = 1, rc = 3.5.
J(x = 1, rc = 3.5) =
[− 118 0
0 34116 − 11a12
]
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are λ1 = − 118 < 0 and λ2 = 34116 − 11a12 . In the main text, we change
a1 = 2, 0.5, 0 respectively. Under all these circumstances, λ2 > 0. Therefore the fixed point (x = 1, rc = 3.5) is
always unstable.
(5) x = 1, rc =
25
16 +
a1
2 , which is the intersection of the control curve θiPc − Pd = ai and the boundary x = 1.
J(x = 1, rc =
25
16
+
a1
2
) =
[
9
16 − a12 0
(a12 − 916 )(a12 − 3116 )(a1 + 18 )( 3a14 + 3932 ) 2(a12 − 916 )(a12 − 3116 )(a1 + 18 )
]
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are λ1 =
9
16 − a12 and λ2 = 2(a12 − 916 )(a12 − 3116 )(a1 + 18 ). Therefore, when
a1 ∈ ( 98 , 318 ), we have λ1 < 0 and λ2 < 0 at the same time, the fixed point (x = 1, rc = 2516 + a12 ) is stable. When
a1 ∈ [0, 98 ) or a1 > 318 , however, the fixed point is unstable.
In conclusion, we analyze the stability of all five boundary fixed points in Fig. 2 in the main text, among which
(x = 0, rc = 1.5) is always stable and (x = 0, rc = 3.5), (x = 1, rc = 1.5), (x = 1, rc = 3.5) are always unstable,
while the stability of (x = 1, rc =
25
16 +
ai
2 ) depends on the parameter ai.
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Appendix B: Constructive proof for the existence of control laws in the
general framework.
Figure S1: The existence of control laws for any desired final state (x0, r0) with a given initial state (x1, r1).
(A) (x0, r0) is beneath the equilibrium curve while (x1, r1) is over the equilibrium curve. (B) (x0, r0) is over the
equilibrium curve while (x1, r1) is beneath the equilibrium curve.
Here we provide a constructive proof for the existence of control laws when given a certain final state (x1, r1)
with an initial state (x0, r0). For simplicity and without loss of generality, we fix the following parameters: α =
1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5 in our general framework.
(i) In Fig. S1A, we prove the existence of control laws when (x0, r0) is beneath the equilibrium curve while
(x1, r1) is over the equilibrium curve. Under the fixed parameters, when x0 ≤ 1/12, the initial fraction of cooperators
is too small that the system will finally evolve into a mutual defection state in our framework. Assume x0 > 1/12.
(a) Firstly, we prove that we can control any given initial state evolving to the stable fixed point on the equilibrium
curve that can arbitrarily approaches to the endpoint (1/12, 3.5). When x0 is close to 1/12, we can simply use
f1 = (Pc − Pd)((2Pc − Pd)− 1.2)(2− (2Pc − Pd)) with time-dependent switching control law. Let  be sufficiently
large, then (x0, r0) will finally stop at a stable fixed point (x
∗
0, r
∗
0) which can arbitrarily approaches to (1/12, 3.5)
on the equilibrium curve, like shown in the figure. When x0 is relatively large, we may use state-dependent control
laws in which f0 = (Pc − Pd)(2 − (2Pc − Pd)) and change  to control the initial state evolving to a desired new
region where x0 is close to 1/12 in advance. Then similarly, we use f1 and let  be large enough to control the
system evolving to the stable fixed point (x∗0, r
∗
0). (b) Then we prove that the trajectories begin from (x
∗
0, r
∗
0 + δ)
which is close to (1/12, 3.5) can actually cover the whole region over the equilibrium curve. Here δ denotes a small
disturbance on r∗0 . We present a possible control function f2 = (Pc−Pd)(0−(4Pc−Pd)). Define G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)() as the
set of trajectories that begin from (x∗0, r
∗
0 + δ) with control function f2 and relative feedback speed . G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)()
is a continuous function of t, x, rc and . When  is small enough, G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)() finally stops at (1, 2.125) which is
the endpoint of the equilibrium curve. Meanwhile, when  → ∞, the trajectory stops at a stable fixed point that
infinitely approaches to (x∗0, r
∗
0). According to the continuity of , we derive that the trajectory set G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)()
can end at any fixed point ranging from (x∗0, r
∗
0) to (1, 2.125). Further, given any x = xi, when → 0, G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)(0)
goes through (xi, r
∗
0) while we already proved that there exists a i that makes G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)(i) stop at (xi, ri) on the
equilibrium curve, in which ri = 1.5 + 2.5/(3xi + 1). Again the continuity of  results in traversal for all the points
on x = xi, rc ∈ [ri, r∗0 ] by G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)(). Therefore, we conclude that G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)() can go through any point in
the region {(x, rc) : x ∈ (x∗0, 1], rc ∈ [1.5 + 2.5/(3x+ 1), r∗0 ]}. Let (x∗0, r∗0)→ (1/12, 3.5), we come to the conclusion
that the trajectories G(x∗0 ,r∗0+δ)() cover the whole region over the equilibrium curve, which indicates the existence
of control laws to reach to any desired (x1, r1) that is over the equilibrium curve.
2
(ii) In Fig. S1B, we prove the existence of control laws when (x0, r0) is over the equilibrium curve while
(x1, r1) is beneath the equilibrium curve. (a) Firstly, we can control any given (x0, r0) evolves to a stable fixed
point (x∗0, r
∗
0) that can arbitrarily approaches to (1, 2.125) using time-dependent switching control laws with control
function f1 = (Pc−Pd)(0− (4Pc−Pd)) and a proper relative feedback speed , as already proved in (i). (b) Define
G(x∗0 ,r∗0−δ)() as the set of trajectories that begin from (x
∗
0, r
∗
0 − δ) with a certain control function f2 and relative
feedback speed . Let f2 = (Pc − Pd)(2 − (2Pc − Pd)). Similarly we can prove that G(x∗0 ,r∗0−δ)() goes through all
the points in the region {(x, rc) : x ∈ [0, x∗0), rc ∈ [1.5, r∗0 − δ)}. Randomly choose a ri < r∗0 , then we can reach to
any point on r = ri, as shown in the figure. Finally, for any final state (x1, r1) beneath the equilibrium curve that
satisfies r1 ≥ r∗0−δ, there exists a unique trajectory which belongs to the phase space of the co-evolutionary system
with control function f3 = (Pc − Pd)((2Pc − Pd) − 1.2)(2 − (2Pc − Pd)) and a sufficiently large feedback speed ,
that goes through (x1, r1). Assume the intersection of this trajectory and r = ri is (xi, ri), then we have a possible
control path from (x∗0, r
∗
0 − δ) to (xi, ri) and finally reaches to (x1, r1). In summary, we can always find a group of
control laws given any (x0, r0) that is over the equilibrium curve and (x1, r1) that is beneath the equilibrium curve.
Combining (i)(ii) which actually provide a possible control loop in phase space, we constructively prove the
existence of control laws given any initial state (x0, r0) and final state (x1, r1), as long as the initial fraction of
cooperators x0 is not too small.
3
